

## Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI): Efficient Technique and Analysis

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**ABSTRACT:** This paper deals extensively on Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) techniques, using a three tank system with two inputs, three measured outputs and three States. And describes how the Fault detection and Isolation was carried out on each of the datasets provided. This report also describes how the simulation was developed to confirm the fault earlier detected and isolated. Finally the effects of complete failure of the sensor L3 and the ways of mitigating the adverse effects were carried out.

**KEYWORDS** –Fault detection, Fault isolation, Datasets, Components failure

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### I. INTRODUCTION

In today's industrial world, there is need for control and automation and its usefulness cannot be over emphasize. Everyday team of engineers are designing and manufacturing new equipment with more sophisticated technologies, in order to ease problems humans are encountering in the technological world. These new pieces of equipment, with their new technologies come with diverse complexity. In as much as the engineers are trying to solve problems, this will not be done at the expense of safety to the humans and the environment, which is also of great concern to the engineers. The engineers are also concern about the safety impact the equipment will create when in operation and when it fails. When equipment is in operation, they do not pose as much threat as compared to when they fail to function. This failure sometimes can be catastrophic. No equipment is design to last forever, as such failure is expected; equipment failure occurs as a result of use, wear and tear. Sometimes, it very difficult to identify the component that is malfunctioning or that has failed completely in a machine. This necessitates the study of Fault detection and Isolation in a system.

Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) system uses diagnostic signals called Residuals caused by changes in the plant expected behaviour, based on the trending of the input commands and the measured outputs. Fault detection, is a rapid and spontaneous test carried out in a system to ascertain if a fault does exist. And if the fault does exist, the Fault Isolation process is use to identify the exact location of the fault(s) in the loop or equipment. [5]

### II. OJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH

The following are the aims of this research work:

- To identify the presence of a fault in the datasets provided
- To isolate the fault to a particular sensor affected
- To develop a simulation for the system, including the capability of injecting faults.
- Toinvestigate and analyse the effects of the faults identified in the datasets using the simulation.
- To mitigate the effects of the faults on the system





The number of inputs and outputs are represented by nx and ny respectively.

$$E = \begin{pmatrix} 0.9880 & 0.0001 & 0.0109 & 64.5760 & 0.0014 & 0.0000 & 0.0000 & 0.0000 \\ 0.0001 & 0.9778 & 0.0114 & 0.0014 & 64.2120 & 0.0000 & 0.0000 & 0.0000 \\ 0.0109 & 0.0114 & 0.9776 & 0.3571 & 0.3721 & 0.0000 & 0.0000 & 0.0000 \end{pmatrix} - \quad 12$$

$$F = [C, D, I(ny)] - \quad 13$$

$$F = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix} - \quad 14$$

Fault can be detected by using the ARM process described above and carrying out the following:

- measurement system outputs
- observation
- analyzing the obtained signals and
- making a decision if the system is behaving normally

A change in the normal behaviour of the system indicates the probability of a presence of fault in that system. With the Analytical Redundancy Method (ARM), parity equations from state space models are used to generate residuals which represent the comparison between the real and the modeled systems.

Ideally, if there are no faults, then it will be zero.

The representation of the non-fault system is given the expression:

$$Pk = wT(Yk - MUK - LXk) = 0 - \quad 15$$

Where:

wT is a transforming vector

Y<sub>k</sub> is measurement data

U<sub>k</sub> is the input and

M is dependent on state model parameters.

$$Uk = \begin{pmatrix} u_{k-7} \\ \vdots \\ u_{k-2} \\ u_{k-1} \\ u_k \end{pmatrix} - \quad 16$$

$$Xk = \begin{pmatrix} x_{k-7} \\ \vdots \\ x_{k-2} \\ x_{k-1} \\ x_k \end{pmatrix} - \quad 17$$

$$Yk = \begin{pmatrix} y_{k-7} \\ \vdots \\ y_{k-2} \\ y_{k-1} \\ y_k \end{pmatrix} - \quad 18$$

The left null space of matrix L can be found using Singular Value Decomposition [1]. The transforming vector wT is selected such that it lies in the Left Null Space of L.

Therefore wTL=0






FIGURE 5: zoomed Residual Plot for dataset\_008\_1.csv showing no fault occurrence

Figures 4 and 5 are plots of residuals for the dataset with no indication of fault occurrence. This implies that there is no fault occurrence in the dataset.

Figure 5 is a zoomed (scaled y-axis of -1 to +1) version of figure 4.

### VI. FAULT ISOLATION

This is the process of identifying and narrowing down a fault to a particular component (sensor or actuator) that is making the system to behave abnormally; this can be done using fault signatures or codes that are assigned specifically to certain behaviours that are exhibited in the system.

Faults are isolated using coding sets on residuals. Residual generated must be close to zero to achieve fault isolation. One way of enhancing the residual involves generating a residue vector so that, in response to a particular fault. Only a fault-specific sub-set is non-zero [3].

The fault in the system is assigned as a P matrix as expressed in equation 21.

$$P_k = w \times N \times P \neq 0 \quad - \quad 21$$

Since fault codes are specific for each fault, the fault signatures can be generated by multiplying P by alpha (α).

$$\text{pattern} * P_k = \alpha \times w \times N \times P \quad - \quad 22$$

Where pattern refers to a vector set of fault codes whose components identify each fault in P. Then:

$$\text{pattern}(Joe) = \alpha \times w \times N \quad - \quad 23$$




FIGURE 6: Structured Residual Image scan for dataset showing fault occurrence at time: approximately 566 seconds (Alpha\*r)




FIGURE 7: Zoomed Fault Code scanned Image for datasetshowing fault occurrence at the third output  $Z_3(\alpha(\alpha)*W*N)$




FIGURE 8: Fault Code scanned Image for dataset showing fault occurrence at the third output  $Z_3$  and it multiples ( $\alpha$  ( $\alpha$ )\* $W$ \* $N$ )




FIGURE 9: Bar (fault signature) for dataset showing fault residual structure

The figures 6, 7 and 8 shows that the fault earlier detected in the dataset in Figure 3 was from the third output device  $Z_3$  of the system. The fault isolation was achieved by generating coding set (**Joe**). The coding set for the dataset is shown below and it is an 8x8 matrix with the Rows representing Residuals and the Column representing States ( $X_1, X_2$  and  $X_3$ ), inputs ( $U_1$  and  $U_2$ ) and Outputs ( $Z_1, Z_2$  and  $Z_3$ ).

Table 1: Coding Set for dataset\_008\_0 Fault Isolation

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Joe} = & \begin{matrix} 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1; r_1 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0; r_2 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1; r_3 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0; r_4 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1; r_5 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1; r_6 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1; r_7 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0; r_8 \end{matrix} \\
 & X_1 X_2 X_3 U_1 U_2 Z_1 Z_2 Z_3
 \end{aligned}$$

The fault signature of the isolated the fault in dataset is as represented below:  
 (1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0)

This fault signature is similar to the one found on the eighth column ( $Z_3$ ) of the coding set (Joe). Also this repeats in multiples of the eighth columns (16<sup>th</sup>, 24<sup>th</sup>, 32<sup>nd</sup>, and 40<sup>th</sup>) in Figure 8.

Since the first three columns of the coding set represents States  $X_1$ ,  $X_2$  and  $X_3$ , the 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> columns represents the Inputs ( $U_1$  and  $U_2$ ) and columns 6th, 7th and 8th represents the Outputs  $Z_1$ ,  $Z_2$  and  $Z_3$  respectively.

Then it is observed clearly from Figure 7, that the fault in dataset that occurred at time of about 566 seconds (Figure 3) is at the third output device  $Z_3$  and  $Z_3$  has been isolated as the faulty device in the system, using structured parity equation.


The colourbar magnitude (range) of figures 6, 7 and 8 are the same. A close look at the fault code and the residuals generated, shows that they are represented by the same magnitudes and this further confirms the presence of the fault.

**VII. FAULT VERIFICATION**


The essence of fault verification is to simulate a system and inject the faults earlier detected and isolated in previous sections into a fault free system and observe if the faults will be detected in the same pattern and at the same time they occurred in the detection and isolation process.

**VIII. FAULT VERIFICATION OF DATASET:**

**comparison of injected and earlier obtained**



**FIGURE 10:SIMULATED/ Injected Residual Plot for fault showing fault occurrence at tie: approximately 561 seconds**



**FIGURE 11: Residual Plot for dataset showing fault occurrence at time: approximately 566 seconds (Earlier obtained)**

From figures 10 and 11, it can be observed that when the faults  $P(8) = 0.9$  was injected at the same time the fault occurred in dataset (566 seconds), into the fault free system simulated, it was observed that, the residuals plot showing time of fault occurrence, the fault residual structures, fault codes and the fault signatures of dataset: were similar in pattern to that of the **dataset** earlier obtained in section three above.

Comparing the figures as shown beside each other, they virtually matched, except that the time of occurrence of the injected fault happened at about 561 seconds and the initially detected fault of dataset \_008\_0 occurred at about 566 seconds. Also a slight difference was observed in the colourbar magnitude of the structure residuals image scan. Finally the fault signature Bars for the injected faults are on the negative region while that of the detected dataset \_008\_0 are on the positive and with greater magnitude.

It can also be observed that the simulated isolated fault and the earlier isolated fault occurred following the same pattern of fault signature  $P = \{1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0\}$  and both indicated faulty third output  $Z_3$  of the system.

The faults earlier detected and isolated, have been verified after being injected into a fault free simulation the is similar to the one used in obtaining the dataset.

## IX. CONCLUSION

From the above analysis and fault diagnosis, it can be observed that fault detection with specific time of occurrence can be achieved on either faulty state, input or output. Fault isolation is also achieved from the fore analysis and specific faulty device is isolated.

The objectives of this piece of work were achieved with the aid of a MATLAB program. A fault free simulation program was built for fault verification purposes. The isolated faults were further subjected to verification process; this was done to ascertain the faults obtained from the datasets were the same as the ones injected into the fault free simulation earlier.

The effects of complete failure of sensor  $L_3$  was simulated and analysed. From the above analysis it was observed that detection of double fault occurring simultaneously can be detected with known dynamics behaviour of the system with no specific time of occurrence, but fault isolation was not possible. It will require a multi-fault isolation method.

The mitigation to such effect (complete failure of third output sensor) was also offered using the Fault Detection, Isolation and Adaptive Reconfigurable Controllers. Another method of mitigating the complete failure of  $L_3$  is to decouple it from the system and re-define the output matrix.

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